Horizontal Mergers and Partial Privatization in a Mixed Oligopoly II by 藤原 憲二 & Kenji Fujiwara
??Horizontal Mergers and Partial
Privatization in a Mixed Oligopoly II
Kenji Fujiwara¤ ?
This paper develops a model of mixed oligopoly to establish that (i)
a horizontal merger involving a public ¯rm is pro¯table if the public ¯rm
is insu±ciently privatized, that (ii) such a merger unambiguously raises
the outsiders' pro¯t, but that (iii) it involves welfare losses. Therefore,
the presence of a semi-public ¯rm is irrelevant to the e®ect of a merger
on the outsiders' pro¯t and welfare while it plays a nontrivial role for
the merger pro¯tability.
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1 Introduction
Is a horizontal merger bene¯cial to the inside and outside ¯rms, and
welfare? There is a considerable literature to theoretically address this
question, most of which is inspired by a seminal work of Salant et al. (1983).
Assuming (i) linear demand and marginal cost, (ii) a homogeneous good
(perfect substitute), (iii) Cournot-Nash competition, (iv) no cost synergy,
and (v) a static setting, they demonstrate that a merger is unpro¯table
unless the merger involves more than 80 per cent market share. This
result is so striking from not only theoretical but also practical points of
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view that many successors have considered its robustness by relaxing the
above assumptions.1)
Along with the previous works above, Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2003)
and Mendez-Naya (2008) highlight the role of partial privatization. Look-
ing at the real world, a public ¯rm is frequently acquired by private ¯rms,
making their study interesting. They show that the pro¯tability of a merger
depends on the degree of privatization. This paper is also along the same
line as theirs, but our aim di®ers from that of the existing literature at
least in three respects.
First, both Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2003) and Mendez-Naya (2008)
assume a quadratic cost, i.e., increasing marginal cost.2) In other words,
they deviate from Salant et al. (1983) in two respects: the presence of a
public ¯rm and increasing marginal cost. Given that Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) have already proved that Salant et al.'s (1983) result is invalid under
increasing marginal cost, the ¯nding established by the above two papers
is quite natural. In order to pay attention to the role of a semi-public
¯rm exclusively, we continue to assume constant marginal cost in analysis.
Second, these papers assume that the public ¯rm merges with only one
private ¯rm. Instead, we allow for an arbitrary number of insider ¯rms
and outsider ¯rms, which is in accordance with Salant et al. (1983). And
1) See Footnote 4 in Qiu and Zhou (2005, p. 39) according to which Perry and Porter
(1985) allow for increasing marginal cost, Farrell and Shapiro (1990) incorporate
cost synergies, Lommerud and Sorgard (1997) consider product di®erentiation, and
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) assume Bertrand-Nash competition. Moreover,
Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2001) and Benchekroun (2003) show the possibility
of a pro¯table merger in a dynamic game model of oligopoly.
2) Although it is a common practice to assume increasing marginal cost in the lit-
erature on mixed oligopoly, the assumption of increasing marginal cost makes the
impact of the presence of a public ¯rm less transparent. Furthermore, Barcena-
Ruiz and Garzon (2003) incorporate product di®erentiation, which makes it even
harder to compare their result with that of Salant et al. (1983).
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¯nally, our de¯nition of `merger pro¯tability' is di®erent from that in the
above predecessors. While we do not claim that our de¯nition is more
plausible, our de¯nition of merger pro¯tability has a certain meaning.
Our main results are summarized as follows. First, if the public ¯rm
is insu±ciently privatized, the merger can be pro¯table. Second, if the
number of insider (resp. outsider) ¯rms increases (resp. decreases), the
pro¯table merger is more likely. Third, such a merger is always pro¯t-
enhancing for the outsider ¯rms for any degree of privatization. Finally,
the merger unambiguously reduces welfare.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sketches a basic
model and describes a pre-merger equilibrium. Section 3 derives the post-
merger equilibrium. Then, Section 4 examines how privatization a®ects
the pro¯tability of a merger. Section 5 considers the e®ects of a merger on
the outsiders' pro¯t and welfare. Section 6 concludes.
2 A pre-merger equilibrium
As a preliminary, this section characterizes the equilibrium before a
merger. In order to make our argument as parallel to Salant et al. (1983)
as possible, we consider an oligopolistic model with linear demand and
constant marginal cost. The inverse demand function is given by p =
a ¡ X; a > 0 where p and X are the price and industry output, respec-
tively. There are potentially three types of ¯rms in the industry: (i) one
public ¯rm (indexed by 0), (ii) m ¸ 2 ¯rms participating in the merger,
and (iii) n ¸ 2 outsider ¯rms. All of these ¯rms share an identical marginal
cost c > 0 which is less than a.
While m + n private ¯rms maximize pro¯ts, the public ¯rm maximizes
the weighted sum of pro¯t ¼0 and welfare U by following the formulation
of Matsumura and Kanda (2005):3)
3) See also Matsumura (1998) on assuming this type of objective function of the
public ¯rm.
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µ¼0 + (1¡ µ)U
= µ¼0 + (1¡ µ)
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X
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
= ¼0 + (1¡ µ)

X2
2
+
X
¼i +
X
¼j

; µ 2 [0; 1]; (1)
where X2=2 is consumer surplus, and ¼i and ¼j are the pro¯t of the private
¯rms. Each individual ¯rm's pro¯t is de¯ned by
¼0 = (a¡ c¡X)x0 (2)
¼i = (a¡ c¡X)xi (3)
¼j = (a¡ c¡X)xj : (4)
The public ¯rm chooses x0 to maximize (1) whereas private ¯rms respec-
tively maximize (3) and (4) with a Cournot-Nash conjecture. Then, the
system of the ¯rst-order conditions for the associated maximization prob-
lem is 26664
µ + 1 m n
1 m+ 1 n
1 m n+ 1
37775
26664
x0
xi
xj
37775 =
26664
a¡ c
a¡ c
a¡ c
37775 ;
which leads to the following outputs and pro¯ts in equilibrium:
x0 =
a¡ c
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
; xi = xj =
µ(a¡ c)
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
(5)
¼pre0 = µ

a¡ c
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
2
(6)
¼prei = ¼
pre
j =

µ(a¡ c)
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
2
; (7)
where superscript pre indicates the pre-merger equilibrium.
3 A post-merger equilibrium
This section moves on to the situation in which the public ¯rm and m
¯rms merge and behave as a cartel. After the merger, each insider ¯rm
|172|
Fujiwara?Horizontal Mergers and Partial Privatization in a Mixed Oligopoly II
chooses output to maximize the modi¯ed objective:
µ

¼0 +
X
¼i

+ (1¡ µ)

X2
2
+ ¼0 +
X
¼i +
X
¼j

= ¼0 +
X
¼i + (1¡ µ)

X2
2
+
X
¼j

: (8)
That is, the cartel chooses the output of each insider ¯rm to maximize the
weighted sum of joint pro¯t and welfare. On the other hand, the problem
of the outsider ¯rms is the same as that in the previous section. The system
of ¯rst-order conditions in this case is abbreviated to24(µ + 1)(m+ 1) n
m+ 1 n+ 1
3524x0
xj
35 =
24a¡ c
a¡ c
35 ;
where use is made of the symmetry assumption that x0 = xi for insider
¯rms. Solving this system allows us to ¯nd the equilibrium outputs and
pro¯ts:
x0 =
a¡ c
(m+ 1)[µ(n+ 1) + 1]
; xj =
µ(a¡ c)
µ(n+ 1) + 1
(9)
¼post0 =
µ
m+ 1

a¡ c
µ(n+ 1) + 1
2
(10)
¼postj =

µ(a¡ c)
µ(n+ 1) + 1
2
; (11)
where superscript post stands for the post-merger equilibrium.
4 Merger pro¯tability and privatization
Having computed the equilibrium pro¯ts before and after the merger,
we are ready to examine how the merger pro¯tability is a®ected by priva-
tization. We de¯ne the merger pro¯tability as the di®erence between the
aggregate pro¯t of the insider ¯rms after merger and that before merger.
Making use of (6), (7) and (10), it is given by
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(m+ 1)¼post0 ¡ ¼pre0 ¡m¼prei
= µ

a¡ c
µ(n+ 1) + 1
2
¡ µ

a¡ c
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
2
¡m

µ(a¡ c)
µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
2
=
µ(a¡ c)2¡
[µ(n+ 1) + 1]2[µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1]2
(12)
¡´ [µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1]2 ¡ (µm+ 1)[µ(n+ 1) + 1]2: (13)
The rest of our task in this section is to identify a few properties of ¡.
In particular, we pay special attention to how µ a®ects the sign of ¡. For
this purpose, it is convenient to rewrite (13) as follows.
¡ = µm
¡(n+ 1)2µ2 +mµ + 1 ; (14)
which immediately yields:
Proposition 1. A merger is pro¯table if and only if
µ < µ ´ m+
p
m2 + 4(n+ 1)2
2(n+ 1)2
: (15)
An inspection of µ in (15) leads to:
Lemma 1. µ is increasing in m and decreasing in n.
Lemma 1 claims that an increase in the number of insider ¯rms makes
the merger more pro¯table and vice versa if the number of outsider ¯rms
increases.
Remark 1. In the foregoing arguments, we have allowed for an arbitrary
number of inside and outside ¯rms. Let us address what we can infer if the
number of insiders is equal to that of outsiders. Then, ¡ in (14) simpli¯es
to4)
4) Note that the number of insiders is m + 1 consisting of m private ¯rms and one
public ¯rm in the present setting.
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¡jn=m+1 = µm
¡(m+ 2)2µ2 +mµ + 1 ;
from which it follows that a merger is pro¯table if and only if
µ <
m+
p
m2 + 4(m+ 2)2
2(m+ 2)2
:
Therefore, our model gives a simple counter-example to the losses-from-
merger proposition of Salant et al. (1983) since it enables us to state that
a merger is pro¯table in the presence of a semi-public ¯rm even though the
number of insiders and outsiders is equal.
5 Welfare e®ects of a merger
5.1 E®ects on the outsiders' pro¯t
Regarding the e®ect of a merger on the pro¯t of each outsider ¯rm, we
can state:
Lemma 2. A merger increases each outsider ¯rm's pro¯t unless µ = 0.
Proof. Using (7) and (11), we have
¼postj
¼prej
=

µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1
µ(n+ 1) + 1
2
;
which is guaranteed to be larger than one unless µ = 0. If µ = 0, there is
no net gain for the outsider ¯rm. Q.E.D.
5.2 E®ects on welfare
Finally, let us address the welfare e®ect of a merger. To this end, we
need to compute the welfare level in the pre- and post-merger equilibria.
Recalling that welfare consists of consumer surplus and the sum of pro¯ts
in the oligopolistic sector:
U =
X2
2
+ ¼0 +m¼i + n¼j ; (16)
substituting (5)-(7) into (16), the pre-merger welfare becomes
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Upre =
[µ(m+ n) + 1][µ(m+ n+ 2) + 1](a¡ c)2
2[µ(m+ n+ 1) + 1]2
: (17)
Analogously, substituting (9)-(11) into (16), the post-merger welfare is
Upost =
(µn+ 1)[µ(n+ 2) + 1](a¡ c)2
2[µ(n+ 1) + 1]2
: (18)
By comparing (17) and (18), we have arrived at:
Proposition 2. A merger is welfare-reducing unless µ = 0.
Proof. While it is possible to directly compare (17) and (18), we employ
another strategy. If we de¯ne
F (n) ´ (µn+ 1)[µ(n+ 2) + 1]
[µ(n+ 1) + 1]2
;
the pre-merger welfare is expressed by Upost = F (n)(a ¡ c)2=2 and the
post-merger welfare Upre = F (m+n)(a¡ c)2=2. Consequently, it is fair to
say that Upost < Upre once we can show that F (n) is increasing. To see if
this is the case, let us di®erentiate F (n) to get
F 0(n) = 2

µ
µ(n+ 1) + 1
3
> 0:
Accordingly, we can establish that that Upost < Upre as is to be proved.
Q.E.D.
Therefore, the presence of a semi-public ¯rm su±ces to reestablish the
losses-from-merger proposition of Salant et al. (1983). In view of that
semi-public ¯rms are more or less present in any country, this result can
cast a serious skepticism to a merger activity.
Remark 2. In the preceding argument, we have assumed that the merger
involves a participation of the public ¯rm. However, this is not always
the case and it is possible to make a parallel argument by supposing that
the public ¯rm is excluded from the merger. This is a main purpose of a
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companion paper, Fujiwara (2010). In that paper, we prove that exactly
the same conclusion survives the case in which the public ¯rm is not an
insider of the merger.
6 Concluding remarks
We have made clear some implications of privatization for the e®ect of a
merger involving a public ¯rm. We stress that our tack should be regarded
as a complement rather than a substitute to the previous studies , e.g.,
Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2003) and Mendez-Naya (2008). Our dissatis-
faction comes not from their result but from their deviation from Salant
et al. (1983) in assumptions. As already mentioned in Introduction, both
of these papers allow for increasing marginal cost as well as a public ¯rm.
Hence, there are two possible sources which make their result di®er from
that of Salant et al. (1983): increasing marginal cost and privatization. In
other words, it is di±cult to straightforwardly compare their result with
that of Salant et al. (1983) in the sense that which factor has a crucial
impact on the result. In contrast, we deviate from Salant et al. (1983)
only in one respect by maintaining the assumption of constant marginal
cost, which has allowed us to ¯nd some interesting results on the merger
that has never established.
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